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LEGAL POSITIVISM AND RUSSELL’S PARADOX 
DAVID GRAY CARLSON

 
ABSTRACT 
In this Article, I argue that legal positivism is subject to the same 
paradox as was engendered by Frege’s set theory–a paradox that has 
come to be known as Russell’s Paradox. Basically, Frege tried to define 
what a set is. Russell showed that, because of self-reference, any attempt 
to define the word “set” led to formal condition. I argue that Russell’s 
analysis can be applied to legal positivism, if “legal positivism” is defined 
to mean that a complete and closed rule of recognition for law is a logical 
possibility. I also argue that, to the extent legal positivism claims that law 
is not necessarily related to morality, then legal positivism is committed to 
the claim that there is a determinate rule of recognition. Only then can 
one be sure that a given law is purely a legal rule and not a moral rule. 
Because of the paradox, it is not logically coherent to divorce law and 
morality entirely, because no final and complete rule of recognition can 
possibly exist. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 But we cannot specify in advance what empirical criteria are 
permissible in the application [of] the formal concepts . . . . We 
cannot impose any limitations in advance on the possible formal 
analogies [i.e., models] which may permit the use . . . of the formal 
concepts in ways antecedently undreamt of by us. There must be 
conditions, directly or indirectly related to . . . intuition . . . for any 
employment . . . of the formal concepts . . . . But those conditions 
are not limited in advance by the scope of our actual knowledge and 
experience. . . . To suppose this would be a kind of restrictive 
dogmatism as unjustified in its way as the inflated dogmatism 
which pretends to a knowledge transcending experience. The latter 
makes an unjustifiable a priori claim to expand knowledge beyond 
experience. The former would make an equally unjustifiable a 
priori claim to restrict reality within the bounds of the kind of 
experience we in fact have. 
P.F. Strawson
1
 
In 1902, Bertrand Russell proved that the set theory of the nineteenth 
century (as propounded by Gottlob Frege) was contradictory. Its defect 
was that it was intensive in nature. Frege had endeavored to set forth the 
rules of recognition by which every empirical example of “set” could be 
identified. These rules of recognition (or axioms) preceded the incidents of 
“sethood.” The whole preceded the parts, and the whole was a rule.2 A set, 
in this theory, could be precisely defined. Frege could describe the set of 
all sets. 
But if this was so, one allowable set in Frege’s system was the set of all 
sets that do not belong to themselves. This self-referential set fuels 
Russell’s Paradox—the downfall of intensive set theory. If such a set 
 
 
 1. P.F. STRAWSON, THE BOUNDS OF SENSE: AN ESSAY ON KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 
166–67 (1966). This volume thanks H.L.A. Hart for reading every sentence of the pre-publication 
manuscript. And so this is a paragraph with which Hart was quite familiar, though, in his Concept of 
Law, he would largely ignore its good advice. 
 2. Quine describes intension as follows: “for any condition you can formulate, there is a class 
whose members are the things meeting the condition. This principle is not easily given up.” W.V. 
QUINE, THE WAYS OF PARADOX AND OTHER ESSAYS 11 (1966). 
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belongs to itself, it does not belong to itself. If it does not belong to itself, 
it belongs to itself. This constitutes a formal contradiction.
3
 After Russell, 
set theory was reformulated to avoid this contradiction. The solution was 
to outlaw any reference to totality—to the set of all sets.4 
Russell’s Paradox obliged set theory to abandon intension in favor of 
extension. Extensive set theory refuses to say what sets are.
5
 It refuses to 
define the set of all sets and therefore never encounters the set of all sets 
that do not belong to themselves. Sets are subjectively intuited by the 
observer; they are not established by pre-existing rules of recognition. In 
post-Russellian set theory, the parts precede the whole. The parts cannot 
be reduced to a rule of recognition. Ironically, the consequence of 
Russell’s discovery—now universally accepted as correct—is that set 
theory has no theory of the set. It cannot say what a set is. Any attempt to 
theorize sets universally results in contradiction. 
Legal positivism asserts that law is a set that does not belong to itself. 
For legal positivism, law is the set of all primary and secondary rules 
selected according to conventional rules of recognition. Whereas every 
individuated law is conventional, the fact that law is this set is not and 
cannot be conventional. Therefore, legal positivism is a set that does not 
belong to itself and so suffers from contradiction. 
Over 100 years after Russell’s Paradox, legal positivism still claims 
that intension (i.e., “meaning”)6 is either possible (soft positivism) or 
absolutely necessary (hard positivism). Accordingly, it is possible to apply 
Russell’s Paradox to legal positivism in order to expose its contradictory 
nature. From this it follows that legal philosophy must give up on 
intension—on positivism itself—and be content with extension only. In an 
extensive jurisprudence, law cannot be reduced to a closed set of rules by 
which law can be recognized. In effect, we cannot say in advance what 
law is. The set of primary rules cannot be reduced to a determinate rule of 
recognition. We can only compile incomplete sets of individual laws. 
Positivism usually claims that law, on the one hand, and morality, on 
the other, are not necessarily connected. This claim, however, depends 
upon the possibility that every primary rule of law has its origin in human 
legislation, rather than in reason. It is thought possible (or perhaps 
 
 
 3. In set theory terms, the set of all sets that do not belong to themselves asserts (x∈x) & -(x∈x), 
where ∈ stands for “belongs to.” 
 4. THOMAS JECH, SET THEORY 4 (3d ed. 2000) (“The set of all sets does not exist”). 
 5. MARY TILES, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SET THEORY 175 (1989). 
 6. Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of “Meaning,” in MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY 215, 219 
(Hilary Putnam ed., 1975). 
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necessary) to close off the set of primary rules from any rule with its 
origin in universal moral principle. Only if this is true can we affirm that 
law and morality are (possibly or necessarily) disjoint sets. Yet, if 
Russell’s Paradox applies to jurisprudence as well as to set theory, this 
claim must be viewed as formally impossible, in which case positivism 
must be abandoned as a failed theory. 
The purpose of this paper is to describe modern Zermelo-Fränkel set 
theory and apply it to positivist jurisprudence. The result is the 
invalidation of positivist jurisprudence, to the extent that it claims that law 
is reducible to the rules of its recognition. But first, I review the positivist 
literature to determine whether those who identify themselves as 
positivists in fact purport to “close the system” by reducing law to the 
rules of its recognition. Many prominent positivists are equivocal. As to 
these, the question arises whether they are entitled to be called positivists 
at all. For the equivocal theorist, law cannot be vouchsafed as having an 
origin solely in human legislation. There are, however, self-described 
positivists who do insist on the possibility of an intensive jurisprudence. 
These latter positivists are guilty of propagating an invalid and 
contradictory theory. 
After reviewing various empirical positivisms, I will proceed to 
demonstrate that Russell’s Paradox can be applied to positivist 
jurisprudence, understood as a purely intensive enterprise. I will try to 
anticipate some objections to this application. Finally, I will examine a 
claim by the arch-positivist Joseph Raz that positivism is indeed guilty of 
paradox. I will show that Raz’s claim is not a version of Russell’s 
Paradox. Indeed, Raz’s demonstration is merely a logical mistake of the 
type known as quaternio terminorum. Positivism is therefore innocent of 
Raz’s Paradox, though guilty of Russell’s Paradox. 
I. POSITIVISM AS A CLOSED SYSTEM 
What is positivism? In recent decades it has been difficult to say. But 
perhaps the core belief (erroneous, in my view) is that law is not 
necessarily connected with morality.
7
 What is morality? Scandalously, 
positivim fails to provide an adequate definition beyond the claim that law 
is not necessarily connected with it. For the purposes of this Article, I 
follow Kant in defining morality as normative statements about human 
 
 
 7. W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM 166 (1994) (“the distinguishing feature of 
inclusive positivism is the claim that the moral considerations can, but need not, figure properly in 
determinations of laws, i.e., attempts to determine the existence or content of valid laws”). 
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behavior that are universally valid and that are derived from universal 
reason. So conceived, all discourses have a moral dimension, including 
mathematical discourse. Set theory, after all, recommends that no 
reference be made to totality (lest contradiction arise). This is purely a 
normative (and categorical) imperative. Set theory does not deny the 
existence of totality or of contradiction. It condemns thought that falls 
prey to it. 
Even the core belief that law is not necessaily connected to morality 
has been denied by some self-described positivists.
8
 But positivism must 
stand for something. How can I (or why should I) oppose a philosophy that 
stands for nothing? So I will operate on the assumption, perhaps incorrect, 
that positivism still asserts that law and morality are not necessarily 
connected. But this in turn requires an intensive jurisprudence grounded in 
rules of recognition. Intension is needed to assure the possibility of a set of 
primary rules none of which has an origin in morality. Those who assert 
the disjunctivity (possible or actual) of law and morality are wedded to 
intensive jurisprudence and therefore to contradiction. The demonstration 
of the contradiction proves that law cannot be separated from morality. 
Are there any empirical positivists who think positive law is a closed 
system? To show that I am not just arguing against nobody, I review a few 
notorious positivisms to discern whether they can fairly be said to 
advocate the possibility of a purely intensive jurisprudence. The result 
demonstrates that positivism does exists empirically. 
A. Kelsen 
Probably the granddaddy of modern legal positivism is Hans Kelsen, 
whose Pure Theory of Law purports to yield a scientific description of it.
9
 
But Kelsen by no means closed the system. Indeed, his most famous 
idea—the basic norm, or Grundnorm—stands for an inability to close the 
system. In effect, Kelsen agreed with Kant, who wrote: 
 One can therefore conceive of external lawgiving which would 
contain only positive laws; but then a natural law would still have to 
 
 
 8. Jules L. Coleman, Methodology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 328 (Jules L. Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); see also JULES COLEMAN, 
THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 161 
(2001); but see Jules Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 703, 711, 716 
(1991) (“Though no proponent or critic of legal positivism denies that positivism is committed to the 
separability thesis, there is far less agreement about what it means . . . “). 
 9. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 218 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. 1967). 
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precede it, which would establish the authority of the lawgiver (i.e., 
his authorization to bind others by his mere choice).
10
 
Kelsen’s basic norm is in fact no norm at all, but an absence where a norm 
should be. Kelsen writes: 
 According to a positivistic theory of law the validity of positive 
law rests on a basic norm, which is not a positive but a presupposed 
norm, hence not a norm of the positive law whose validity is 
founded on the basic norm. . . .
11
 
The best way to think of the basic norm is to imagine back when, as a 
child, you continuously asked “why?” when ordered to do something 
painful. Kelsen himself gives the example: 
 For example: A father orders his child to go to school. The child 
answers: Why? The reply may be: Because the father so ordered 
and the child ought to obey the father. If the child continues to ask: 
Why ought I to obey the father, the answer may be: Because God 
has commanded “Obey Your Parents” and one ought to obey the 
commands of God. If the child now asks why one ought to obey the 
commands of God, that is, if the child questions the validity of this 
norm, then the answer is that this question cannot be asked that the 
norm cannot be questioned—the reason for the validity of the norm 
must not be sought: the norm has to be presupposed.
12
 
In Kelsen’s jurisprudence, the inability to close the system is prior to the 
system itself. This undoubtedly explains why Kelsen is so profoundly 
rejected by Anglo-American jurisprudence, which seeks a final and closed 
theory of law—in which law can be reduced to the rules of its 
recognition.
13
 
B. Hart 
Sharply critical of Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart attempted to avoid the infinite 
regress closed by the Grundnorm by dogmatically claiming that law is 
determined by rules of recognition that simply are.
14
 
 
 
 10. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 6:225 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991). 
 11. KELSEN, supra note 9, at 219. 
 12. Id. at 196–97. 
 13. Michael Steven Green, Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems, 54 ALA. L. REV. 365 
(2003) (“Appreciation of Kelsen’s work has been further hampered by his notoriously obscure Kantian 
methodology”). 
 14. SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 84, 90 (2011) (“The rule of recognition validates, but is not itself 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss2/3
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According to Hart, law is a combination of primary rules that 
command, authorize or prohibit behavior, coupled with secondary rules of 
recognition that permit officials to distinguish primary rules
15
 from other 
norms. Rules of recognition are therefore similar to mathematic functions; 
they select a range of members (primary rules and also the secondary rules 
other than the rule of recognition) from a larger domain—the set of all 
norms.
16
 
But did Hart imagine that no law exists unless it comports with a prior 
rule of recognition that grounds it? Perhaps not. Rather, Hart spoke of the 
“uncertainty . . . of the rule of recognition and so of the ultimate criteria 
used by courts in identifying valid rules of law.”17 
To understand the nature of this uncertainty, it is necessary to grasp 
Hart’s notion of the legal penumbra. Every primary rule has a core in 
which application is certain. But this core gives out; beyond the core is the 
penumbra where application is uncertain. With regard to penumbrae 
surrounding the primary rules, judges must use discretion. Here judges do 
not follow law; they make it.
18
 I will call this the first-order penumbra. 
It turns out that rules of recognition also have penumbrae. These I will 
call second-order penumbrae. Imagine that the rule of recognition is 
“whatever Parliament enacts is law.” Hart says that doubts can arise about 
what it means to “enact.”19 At times, second-order doubt resembles the 
doubts located in the first-order penumbra: 
 Sometimes the resolution of [second-order doubt] requires only 
the interpretation of another rule of law which conferred the 
legislative power, and the validity of this may not be in doubt. This 
will be the case, for example, where the validity of an enactment 
made by a subordinate authority is in question, because doubts arise 
 
 
validated . . . the rule of recognition is never valid—it exists . . .”). 
 15. The rule of recognition selects not only to primary rules but also secondary rules of 
adjudication, execution and change. For ease of elocution I will lump together law recognized by a 
rule of recognition as “primary rules.” 
 16. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE 199 (1991) (“To the positivist, there can be systems 
whose norms are identified by reference to some identifier that can distinguish legal norms from other 
norms, such as hose of politics, morality, economics, or etiquette. This identifier, which Hart refers to 
as the ‘rule of recognition’ . . . picks out legal norms from the universe of norms, and thus provides a 
test for legal validity.”). 
 17. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 148 (2d ed. 1994). 
 18. Id. at 251–52 (postscript). 
 19. Id. at 148. 
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as to the meaning of the parent Act of Parliament defining the 
subordinate authority’s legislative powers.20 
Hart writes that such doubt “raises no fundamental questions.”21 
Hart distinguishes such minor doubt from the doubt concerning the 
“competence of the supreme legislature itself.”22 In particular, Hart 
considers whether Parliament could enact a law prohibiting itself from 
enacting a law. Hart refers to this concept as “legislative suicide.”23 I will 
borrow Hart’s idea of legislative suicide to show that legal positivism 
succumbs to Russell’s Paradox. 
Whether a legislature may or may not commit suicide, Hart believes, is 
a legal question that must be settled by the rule of recognition.
24
 
Ultimately, whether Parliament can commit suicide is “an empirical 
question.”25 It is not a moral principle finding its origin in universal 
reason. 
Yet, where the rule of recognition says nothing about suicide, 
“[q]uestions can be raised about it to which at present there is no answer 
which is clearly right or wrong. These can be settled only by a choice, 
made by someone to whose choices . . . authority is eventually 
accorded.”26 Such a conclusion is reminiscent of Kelsen’s basic norm 
(which Hart supposedly opposes but covertly relies upon). 
In the second-order penumbra, “at any moment a question may arise as 
to which there is no answer—only answers.”27 At such moments: 
 The truth may be that, when courts settle previously unenvisaged 
questions concerning the most fundamental constitutional rules, 
they get their authority to decide them accepted after the questions 
have arisen and the decision has been given. Here all that succeeds 
is success. [Sometimes] a very surprising piece of judicial law-
making concerning the very sources of law may be calmly 
“swallowed.” Where this is so, it will often in retrospect be said, 
and may genuinely appear, that there always was an “inherent” 
power in the courts to do what they have done. Yet this may be a 
 
 
 20. Id. at 148. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 151. 
 24. Id. at 149. 
 25. Id. at 150. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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pious fiction, if the only evidence for it is the success of what has 
been done.
28
 
These comments suggest that there is no complete set of rules of 
recognition that can, in turn, close the set of primary rules.
29
 So, on my 
stipulated definition of positivism, the prophet of Anglo-American legal 
positivism does not qualify as a positivist at all. 
If Hart had left off with the first-order penumbra, he would be guilty of 
closing the system, with the proviso that some “cases” fall outside of 
law.
30
 Such a vision, as we shall see, falls prey to Russell’s Paradox. But 
what I have described seems not to be Hart’s view, because of his idea of 
the second-order penumbra. 
The second-order penumbra must differ from the first-order penumbra. 
In the first-order penumbra, the judges perform a legislative function. 
They write a rule and then apply it retroactively to the case before them. A 
judge, however, does not legislate primary rules in the second-order 
penumbra, precisely because rule-devising is the very definition of the 
first-order penumbra. Rather, judges recognize that norms that seem to 
conform to the existing rule of recognition are in fact not primary rules 
after all. 
Let us consider more carefully what a second-order penumbra must 
mean. Imagine the set of all normative statements, some of which are the 
primary rules of law and some of which are non-legal norms. Here are two 
possibilities: 
(1) A norm complies with a rule of recognition and is a primary 
rule. 
(2) A norm does not comply and is not a primary rule. 
These two principles would constitute a genuine positivism. If Hart 
stopped here, he would be guilty of Russell’s Paradox. But Hart can be 
read as also admitting the existence of two more alternatives: 
 
 
 28. Id. at 153. 
 29. Id. at 148 (“In the overwhelming majority of cases the formula ‘Whatever the Queen in 
Parliament enacts is law’ is an adequate expression of the rule as to the legal competence of 
Parliament, and is accepted as an ultimate criterion of the identification of law, however open the rules 
thus identified may be at their periphery. But doubts can arise as to its meaning or scope; we can ask 
what is meant by ‘enacted by Parliament’ . . . .”). 
 30. Set theorists would call Hart’s core “finite support” for a relation between “cases” and 
outcomes. RAYMOND M. SMULLYAN & MELVIN FITTING, SET THEORY AND THE CONTINUUM 
PROBLEM 17, 280 (1996). Outside the finite support there is unruliness where the one-to-one 
correspondence fails. 
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(3) A norm may comply with a rule of recognition but, because of 
its impermissible content, is not a primary rule. The primary rule is 
invalidated in the penumbra of the rule of recognition. 
(4) A norm does not comply with the rule of recognition but is 
nevertheless a primary rule. It is therefore recognized according to 
no rule at all (i.e., unruly recognition). 
These four propositions can be arranged on a matrix. Each can be 
characterized as either a positivist or natural law proposition: 
A norm: Is a Primary Rule Is not a Primary Rule 
Complies with a Rule 
of Recognition 
(1) Positivism (3) Natural Law 
Does not comply with 
a Rule of Recognition 
(4) Natural Law (2) Positivism 
When positivism affirms (1) and (2), it asserts a closed system of 
conventional law and is subject to Russell’s Paradox. A closed system 
disaffirms (3) and (4), because these propositions suggest that some laws 
are necessarily grounded in morality. 
Hart explicitly affirms at least (3). Hart writes, “The words of a statute 
and what it requires in a particular case may be perfectly plain; yet there 
may be doubts as to whether the legislature has power to legislate in this 
way.”31 He does not mention (4).32 As an example of (3), Hart imagines 
that the rule of recognition is “only that which Parliament enacts is a 
primary rule.” But some of the norms passed by Parliament are 
nevertheless not primary rules. In particular, suppose Parliament passes 
this primary rule: “Parliament is forbidden to enact any primary rule.” This 
norm (parliamentary suicide) might be in the penumbra of the rule of 
recognition.
33
 If the suicide provision is an invalid enactment of 
Parliament, it is so because a court has so found it according to no rule at 
all. What otherwise seems a primary rule is recognized as not being one.
34
 
 
 
 31. Id. at 148. 
 32. Oddly, Joseph Raz directly affirms (4). “So long as the rule is incomplete some such 
problems will remain unanswered, but when the courts are faced with such unsolved problems and 
accept a certain solution they modify the rule of recognition. This should surprise no one. The rule of 
recognition, being a customary rule, is constantly open to change.” JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF 
LAW 94 (1979). 
 33. HART, supra note 17, at 150 (“Questions can be raised about it to which at present there is no 
answer which is clearly right or wrong”). 
 34. Marmor maintains that only what Parliament says is law. The court’s refusal to recognize 
entrenchment is a moral rule. Andrei Marmor, Exclusive Legal Positivism, in THE OXFORD 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss2/3
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In effect, a court in the above example must flesh out the rule of 
recognition that was previously thought to exist. Now the rule of 
recognition has become “whatever Parliament enacts, provided that it does 
not enact a self-referential rule about its own enactments.” There are two 
difficulties for positivism so refined. First, it suggests there is no complete 
rule of recognition. Rather, judges do what judges do, and the rule of 
recognition is just an ex posteriori attempt to describe the practice. Such a 
rule in no way constrains practice. Although this adheres to the truth of 
how rules actually function,
35
 an open-ended rule of recognition that is 
subordinate to practice is no positivism. Such a theory cannot sustain the 
disjunction of law and morality. The rule against legislative suicide, for 
instance, must have a supraconventional origin that is not somehow the 
subjective whim of the judge (for otherwise we would be in the first order 
penumbra). 
Hart locates the anti-suicide provision that constrains Parliament inside 
England’s existing rule of recognition.36 In fact, this location is arbitrary. It 
could equally be viewed as a primary rule directed at Parliament itself.
37
 If 
so viewed, then a primary rule exists that never complied with the rule of 
recognition. In short, we could have an instance of (4) in the above matrix, 
not (3). Accordingly, I claim that (3) always implies (4), if we choose to 
locate the restriction on Parliament in the set of primary rules. 
If (3) and (4) are part of the system, then law is generated by a moral 
intuition that is not part of the rule of recognition. Under such a regime, 
morality engenders at least one member in the set of primary rules. Which 
means that Hart is no positivist, as I have defined the term.
38
 For instance, 
it would be incorrect to call Hart a soft positivist because this positition 
asserts the possibility of hard positivism. This is so because only in a hard 
positivism can the possibility of law’s separateness from morality be 
 
 
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 118 (Jules L. Coleman & Scott Shapiro 
eds., 2002). 
 35. I develop this theory of rules in David Gray Carlson, Hart avec Kant: On the Inseparability 
of Law and Morality, 1 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 21 (2009); David Gray Carlson, The Traumatic 
Dimension in Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2287 (2003). See also STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES 
NATURALLY 510–11 (1989). 
 36. Id. at 149–50. 
 37. SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 80 (power-conferring rules and duty-imposing rules equated as 
primary rules under the secondary rule of recognition); see also id. at 98 (“primary legal rules . . . 
confer powers . . . “). 
 38. For a rather different view, see WALUCHOW, supra note 7, at 4, 180 (“. . . all defenders of 
positivism reject the notion of criteria of . . . legal validity inherent in something outside of particular 
legal systems and their accepted tests for validity”). Hart’s second-order penumbra precisely allows in 
something outside of particular legal systems, if “legal systems” is the set of secondary rules of 
recognition. 
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manifested as an actuality. Yet, where the rule of recognition has a 
penumbra, no hard positivist regime can be derived. 
At one point, however, Hart seems to hint that the legal system might 
be closed. Hart says that, in English society, (3) has been excluded by 
incorporating within the rule of recognition the premise that Parliament 
may not commit institutional suicide: 
 That parliament is sovereign in this sense may now be regarded 
as established, and the principle that no earlier Parliament can 
preclude its “successors” from repealing its legislation constitutes 
part of the ultimate rule of recognition used by the courts in 
identifying valid rules of law.
39
 
Hart goes on to say that “no necessity of logic, still less of nature, dictates 
that there should be such a Parliament; it is only one arrangement among 
others, equally conceivable, which has come to be accepted . . . .”40 
If this constitutes a statement that closure of the system is logically 
possible, then perhaps Hart is a positivist after all and therefore guilty of 
Russell’s Paradox. The question therefore devolves into whether Hart 
thinks penumbrae are mere empirical phenomena or are logically required. 
If penumbrae can be eliminated at both the primary and secondary levels, 
then Hart must be counted as a positivist and therefore subject to Russell’s 
Paradox. On this fundamental matter Hart is simply equivocal. 
C. Raz 
Hart’s jurisprudence engendered the fecund critique of Ronald 
Dworkin, who accused positivism of having a closed system that entirely 
excluded morality. This was what Dworkin meant by his mysteriously 
presented “semantic sting.”41 As a result of Dworkin’s various critiques, 
positivism split into hard and soft positivism. The hard positivists claim 
 
 
 39. HART, supra note 17, at 149. 
 40. Id. 
 41. For my interpretation of what Dworkin intends by “the semantic sting,” see David Gray 
Carlson, Dworkin in the Desert of the Real, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 505 (2006). Quine anticipated the 
semantic sting: “In so far as our basic controversy over ontology can be translated upward into a 
semantical controversy about words and what to do with them, the collapse of the controversy into 
question-begging may be delayed.” WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 
14 (1953). 
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that law must exclude morality as a source of primary rules. Its chief 
progenitor is supposed to be Joseph Raz, who wrote: 
 A social condition is necessary for identifying the existence and 
content of the law: A rule is a legal rule only if it meets a social 
condition . . . . A social condition is sufficient for identifying the 
existence and content of the law: A rule is a legal rule if it meets the 
social condition.
42
 
As social conditions are necessary and sufficient, law must be a closed 
system.
43
 Here, “social condition” means a rule that originates in human 
legislation (which is extended to include custom, on the unproven dogma 
that customs always have human origins). It is meant to exclude morality, 
whose origin is in reason and/or God. But origin in godless unreason and 
human pathology is not enough. Hard positivism also insists that the rule 
of recognition be accepted. That is, it must be conventional.
44
 Society 
must believe that the rule of recognition governs generally. 
In the passages that establish the hard positivist manifesto, Raz 
explains why the “sources thesis” is superior to Dworkinian jurisprudence 
and to soft positivism. According to Raz, the function of law is to give 
guidance.
45
 When law gives guidance, it has authority. 
To understand Raz’s concept of authority, we must first describe Raz’s 
underlying psychological theory. According to this theory, human acts are 
rationally caused (or at least potentially so). Prior to acting, a person 
assembles all the reasons that are relative to him. These are “weighed,”46 
and what emerges is a rational decision to which the person is bound. The 
actor, however, is imperfect in practical reasoning and knows it. Someone 
else may know better how to enumerate and weigh the reasons than the 
actor himself. Authority is the acknowledgement of someone else’s 
superior practical reason.  
 
 
 42. RAZ, AUTHORITY, supra note 32, at 40; see also id. at 97 (rules of recognition are “the only 
ultimate laws that necessarily exist in every legal system”). 
 43. But see Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison, in 
HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1, 9, 10 (Jules Coleman ed. 
2001) (stating that “necessary and sufficient” conditions can produce vagueness, that essential 
characteristics might be neither necessary nor sufficient, that concepts can have more than one set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions, and that explanations are “almost always” incomplete). 
 44. JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 4 (1988) (“A social rule is one whose 
authority is a matter of convention”). 
 45. For a dissenting view, see Marmor, supra note 34, at 106–07. 
 46. In Raz’s universe, authority is not absolute but varies in intensity. JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 100 (1986). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
270 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 5:257 
 
 
 
 
Authority is defined as having three elements: 
 (1) The dependence thesis: The norm giver has considered all the 
reasons relevant to the actor; the norm is “dependent” on these 
underlying reasons. 
 (2) The normal justification thesis: The actor thinks that an 
authority knows better than the actor what is good for the actor. 
 (3) The pre-emption thesis: The directive replaces some (but not 
all) of the reasons the actor has assembled.
47
 
In Raz’s vision, the actor thinks that law embodies wisdom (the normal 
justification thesis). Law is not followed just because it is law (as in Hart’s 
internal point of view) but because it plays a part in private rational 
calculation. 
The reason law must have a source in human legislation, Raz thinks, is 
that, whenever moral intuition produces the primary rules of law, the 
primary rule emerges only after the actor acts. This after-the-fact 
revelation of law can provide no guidance. Law in this superegoic form 
can play no part in the practical reason of the actor. From this it 
supposedly follows that law must have a human legislative source. 
Positive law can be researched. Law stemming from the spontaneous 
moral intuition of the judge cannot be researched. In Raz’s universe, we 
cannot, apparently, predict what judges will do.
48
 
Important at present is that Raz’s argument seems to be conditional in 
nature: if law is to guide, then hard positivism is required. Whether law 
can be grounded in that which is useful for practical reason is beyond the 
scope of the present endeavor, which is to show that any closed 
conventional legal system is contradictory. I don’t read Raz as insisting 
that law necessarily guides.
49
 And rightly so. Often law is too vague to 
guide.  
 
 
 47. This is my paraphrase of JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 198 (1994). 
 48. See WALUCHOW, supra note 7, at 121–22 (criticizing the assumption that legal results are 
clear and moral intuitions are unpredictable). 
 49. But see id. at 120 (“As for Raz, it is clear that his ascriptions of purpose are descriptive in 
nature and based not on moral-evaluative ascriptions of worthy purposes but meta-theoretical 
judgments of importance”). Fred Schauer is closer to the point. According to Schauer, all Raz means is 
that some legal systems are “accurately described as positivistic.” SCHAUER, supra note 16, at 198. 
That is, some systems guide, but this is no necessary feature of law. 
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In any case, Raz writes many things that suggest that law is an open 
system. For example: 
 Attempting to formulate criteria of validity based on complex 
court practices that are in a constant state of change and that are 
necessarily vague and almost certainly incomplete, involves not 
only legal perceptiveness and theoretical skill, it demands sound 
judgment and reasonable value-decisions as well. Hart’s theory 
leads one to the point where the boundaries between analytic and 
critical jurisprudence . . . begin to blur.
50
 
Such a passage coheres with a view that says legal practice can never be 
reduced to rules. Rather, practice precedes the rules (i.e., extensive 
theory). Raz also writes: 
 If the theory of the rule of recognition is substantially correct, as 
I think it is, it forms part of the answer to the problem of identity. 
Although it sets necessary conditions for membership in a legal 
system, it does not provide all the sufficient conditions.
51
 
If the rule of recognition is not sufficient, the set of primary rules is not 
closed. And, contra to Raz, the theory of the rule of recognition is quite 
incorrect. A theory is either correct or not. Quantifying a theory 
(“substantially correct”) is to announce that the theory is not falsifiable 
and therefore not a theory. 
Raz also does not seem to protest the connection of morality with law, 
so long as it is conceded that moral principles are:  
 derivative characteristics of law. If all legal systems necessarily 
possess certain moral characteristics they possess them as a result of 
the fact that they have other properties which are necessary for them 
to fulfil their unique social role.
52
 
This seems to say that perhaps all legal systems have primary rules 
engendered by moral intuition. But moral intuition is not enough. (For 
example, the moral intuition must perhaps be that of an official.) 
 
 
 50. RAZ, AUTHORITY, supra note 32, at 94. Raz further indicates that primary rules can be valid 
under rules other than the rule of recognition. He gives as an example, legislated rules, which are valid 
by virtue of “the laws conferring legislative powers . . . .” Id. at 95. So for Raz, “all norms legislated 
by Parliament is law” is not a rule of recognition. This makes little sense, where Parliament confers the 
rule-making power. 
 51. Id. at 97. 
 52. Id. at 104. 
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So if Raz is to be considered a hard positivist, it can only be in the 
sense that it is “hard” to see why this conclusion is justified. Although Raz 
at one point proclaims the sources thesis to be necessary and sufficient to 
close the set of primary rules, he also says many things that contradict to 
this point. Ergo, it is impossible to claim with confidence that Raz is a 
positivist, as I have defined it. The most that can be said is that he is 
occasionally so. 
D. Coleman 
Hart and Raz may forfeit the name “positivist” because they only 
occasionally reduce law to the rules by which individual laws are 
recognized. Jules Coleman, also occasionally, proclaims that law can be 
reduced to the rules of its recognition. Ironically, Coleman is the leader of 
the soft positivists while remaining one of the few positivists who has 
unambiguously stated that hard positivism is possible. 
Soft positivism holds that law can (but need not) exclude morality. Yet, 
Coleman offers the clearest statement of hard positivism that I have been 
able to find. In pursuit of the transcendental essence of law,
53
 Coleman 
puts forth two different principles: negative positivism and 
incorporationism. 
Incorporationism is beyond the scope of this Article. It stands for the 
possibility that law can be completely determined by moral intuition. This 
argument of a closed system of moral intuition is itself contradictory, but 
on grounds different from Russell’s Paradox. This demonstration must be 
deferred to another day. 
 
 
 53. For Coleman, “the fundamental question of analytic jurisprudence [is] what, if anything, is 
essential to our concept of law . . . ?” COLEMAN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 8, at 216; see also RAZ, 
AUTHORITY supra note 32, at 104 (legal philosophy must be concerned with the “necessary and 
universal” features of legal systems). We may pause for a moment to consider how far positivism has 
come from the days of A.J. Ayer, who wrote the principal manifesto of the logical positivists. The 
logical positivists of the Vienna circle named themselves as such because they believed in only two 
forms of truth—logical validity (i.e., tautology) and empirical observation. REBECCA GOLDSTEIN, 
INCOMPLETENESS: THE PROOF AND PARADOX OF KURT GÖDEL 84–90 (2005). Any reference to mental 
states or morality was what A.J. Ayer called nonsense, because these are facts that cannot be observed. 
According to Ayer: 
 [W]e shall maintain that no statement which refers to a “reality” transcending the limits 
of all possible sense experience can possibly have literal significance; from which it must 
follow that the labours of those who have striven to describe such reality all been devoted to 
the production of nonsense. 
A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 34 (1936). Positivism’s attention to essence is no claim 
from ex posteriori knowledge (i.e., based on experience). It is rather a claim to what Kant would have 
called synthetic a priori knowledge. Coleman and Raz are not in the business of sociological 
description but in the transcendental deduction trade. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2013] LEGAL POSITIVISM AND RUSSELL’S PARADOX 273 
 
 
 
 
Our current concern is solely with Coleman’s negative positivism. Why 
negative positivism? “Instead of articulating some truth about all law 
everywhere, negative positivism simply denies that morality is necessarily 
a condition of legality for all possible legal systems.”54 
Negative positivism is organized by a limit case in which all law has 
“pedigree”—that is, traceable to human legislation. “[T]here exists at least 
one conceivable rule of recognition (and therefore one possible legal 
system) that does not specify truth as a moral principle among the truth 
conditions for any proposition of law.”55 This proposition, Coleman 
suggests, is “conceptually unassailable and descriptively accurate. There is 
no logical . . . contradiction in asserting that there exists a possible world 
in which there is law and in which what makes something law is not a 
matter of its morality.”56 
Coleman often insists (dogmatically, by the way) that rules of 
recognition must necessarily be there. “We need a theory of law that 
merges the idea of a rule of recognition with the view that moral principles 
can someimes be binding on officials,” Coleman writes.57 
“Incorporationism responds to legal positivism’s ambitions as a general, 
descriptive jurisprudence. It asserts that wherever there is law, there is a 
social rule (the rule of recognition) that sets out criteria of legal validity.”58 
The rules of recognition are “the signature of a legal system.”59 
Here we have grist for the grindstone of Russell’s Paradox, which 
shows that negative positivism is completely assailable, contradictory to 
the core, and descriptively inaccurate. To be sure, Coleman’s claim is 
only that such a regime is possible, not that it exists or has existed or ever 
will exist.
60
 Possibility encompasses non-existence as well as existence. It 
 
 
 54. Coleman, Social Facts, supra note 8, at 716. 
 55. COLEMAN, MARKETS, supra note 44, at 5 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, Coleman writes: 
 Though no proponent or critic of legal positivism denies that positivism is committed to 
the separability thesis, there is far less agreement about what it means and its implications for 
positivism . . . I understand this to mean that positivism is committed to the view that the 
morality of a norm is not necessarily a condition of its legality. 
Coleman, Social Facts, supra note 8, at 716.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in 
HART’S POSTSCRIPT, supra note 43, at 99, 129 n.45. 
 58. Id. at 145. 
 59. COLEMAN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 8, at 76. 
 60. COLEMAN, MARKETS, supra note 44, at 13–16; Jules Coleman, Reason and Authority, in THE 
AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM, 287, 291 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) (“The 
separability thesis is not the claim that law and morality are necessarily separated; rather, it is the 
claim that they are not necessarily connected”); see also E. Phillip Soper, Legal Theory and the 
Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 75 MICH. L. REV. 473, 512 (1977). 
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excludes only impossibility and contradiction.
61
 What Russell’s Paradox 
will show is that Coleman’s negative positivism is indeed impossible. 
Coleman, however, has lately repented of his positivism, according to a 
recent co-authored piece: 
 Too many commentators have understood the project of 
jurisprudence to be an effort to identify a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for being law or necessary and sufficient 
conditions for being the concept LAW. Many of the features of 
legal practice that are most illuminating for what is to be law, or to 
be laws, are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of legality. 
Hart understood this as well as anyone and displayed his sensitivity 
to it in his jurisprudence. That he is associated with the efforts to 
articulate a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that define the 
concept LAW or provide a definition of “law” remains not only a 
puzzle but something of an embarrassment to the philosophy of 
law.
62
 
As with Raz, it is no longer certain that Coleman can be listed among the 
positivists, as he does not always maintain that law has necessary and 
sufficient conditions of existence. 
E. Rawls 
One does not ordinarily think of John Rawls as a jurisprudential 
theorist, but in his famous essay, Two Concepts of Rules,
63
 he adopts an 
intensive jurisprudence by implication. In this essay, Rawls proposes that 
there are two concepts of rules. The first is the so-called summary concept: 
rules summarize past practices. This is consistent with what I have called 
extensive jurisprudence. In this view, “cases are logically prior to rules.”64 
The other view is the practice concept: rules of practice are “logically prior 
 
 
 61. Rather wickedly, Matthew Kramer points out that, on Coleman’s reading, a legal system that 
consists of judges who decide cases while under the delusion they were acting out Hamlet in a play is 
consistent with positivism because I can imagine it. Matthew H. Kramer, On Morality as a Necessary 
or Sufficient Condition for Legality, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 53, 71–76 (2003). 
 62. Jules L. Coleman & Ori Simchen, “Law”, 9 LEGAL THEORY 1, 41 (2007); cf. COLEMAN, 
MARKETS, supra note 44, at 3 (“Every theory about the nature or essence of law purports to provide a 
standard, usually in the form of a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions, for determining 
which of a community’s norms constitute its law”). 
 63. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955). 
 64. Id. at 22. 
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to particular cases.”65 This latter model of rules closes the system. It 
reduces practice to the rules of recognition, and therefore is a legal 
positivism as I have defined it. These are “rules in the strict sense.”66 The 
summary view entails “rules of thumb”67—not really rules at all but 
merely a prediction of what an actor will do. Rawls’s theory of rules in the 
strict sense therefore falls prey to Russell’s paradox. 
F. Marmor 
Another positivist who argues that the system must be closed (a self-
styled hard positivist) is Andrei Marmor. For Marmor all rules of 
recognition are conventional. And all applications are guaranteed. If there 
is any controversy, then it follows there is no convention and therefore no 
law. Marmor’s complaint against soft positivism is: 
 [I]t assumes that there is a potential gap between the convention, 
which is a rule, and its application, a gap that can be bridged by 
moral and political arguments. The main reply to this is, that there is 
no such gap. The convention is constituted by the practice of its 
application to particular cases. It is not the case that we first have a 
rule-formulation, say that convention “R” prescribes so and so, and 
then we try to make up our minds how to apply R to particular cases 
(and then, as this story goes, sometimes we know the answer, and 
sometimes we argue about it). Conventions are what they are, 
because there is a practice of applying the rule to certain cases; it is 
the application of the rule which constitutes its very existence. Once 
it is not clear . . . whether the convention applies to a certain case or 
not, then there is no conventional solution to that matter, and at least 
as far as the convention is concerned, this is the end of it.
68
 
We have, then, a representative of hard positivism who falls prey to 
Russell’s Paradox. For Marmor, either there is convention (and hence 
law), or there is morality and politics (and hence no law). The two sets of 
norms are conceived as disjoint.  
 
 
 65. Id. at 25. 
 66. Id. at 29. 
 67. Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
 68. Marmor, supra note 34, at 112. 
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G. Waluchow 
Another scholar who seems to close the system is W.J. Waluchow, who 
writes: 
 [T]he positivist’s thesis [is] that a legal system contains a finite 
set of special rules distinguishable according to some master text, 
from all other rules which might be in some way applicable to 
human behaviour.
69
 
And: 
 There is no law beyond or above the law as Dworkin and 
defenders of natural law theory would have it. The law is just that 
determinate and limited set of rules satisfying a socially constituted 
rule of recognition.
70
 
Waluchow, then, agrees with my definition of positivism. If the system 
isn’t closed, then it isn’t positivism. For Waluchow, if the number of 
primary rules is finite, then either (a) the primary rules are overdetermined 
by the rules of recognition (which positivism usually denies), or (b) the 
number of rules of recognition are themselves finite. If (b) is correct, the 
system is closed, and Russell’s Paradox applies. 
H. Schauer 
Our final empirical example of a positivist is Fred Schauer: 
 Imagine a system, however, in which (a) a master rule of 
recognition pedigreed a limited number of rules; (b) all decision-
makers within the system were instructed to make decisions 
according to and only according to those pedigreed rules; and (c) a 
default (or closure) rule specified the result to be reached in all 
cases not covered by one of the pedigreed rules. In such a system, a 
positivistic explanation appears to be sound, and we can thus see 
that positivism as a descriptive thesis is flawed not conceptually . . . 
but only empirically. Few legal systems resemble this stylized 
model, but there is no logical reason why they could not.
71
 
 
 
 69. WALUCHOW, supra note 4, at 34–35. 
 70. Id. at 235. 
 71. SCHAUER, supra note 16, at 202 (emphasis added). 
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In fact, Russell’s Paradox provides the logical reason why legal systems 
cannot resemble (or, shall we say replicate) the closed model. 
At least some empirical positivists, then, have closed the system and 
fallen afoul of Russell’s Paradox. These are the jurisprudences that assert 
the possibility that a rule of recognition might be complete. Several 
jurisprudences equivocate as to the closure of the system. Accordingly, I 
am licensed to proceed to the demonstration that Russell’s Paradox lurks 
within at least some positivisms. 
II. RUSSELL’S PARADOX 
A. The Basic Demonstration 
According to positivism, law and morality are not necessarily 
connected. For this to be true, it must be possible for a rule of recognition 
to define a set of primary rules such that every single primary rule has its 
origin in human legislation. It must exclude all natural law with an origin 
independent of arbitrary human will. If this exclusion cannot be 
accomplished, positivism cannot claim that the set of laws can be entirely 
disjoint from the set of moral norms. 
Russell’s Paradox, however, proves that such a disjoint set of purely 
positive laws is impossible. The paradox involves the set of all sets that do 
not belong to themselves. Here is a helpful verbal account of Russell’s 
Paradox: 
 Consider the set S whose elements are all those (and only those) 
sets that are not members of themselves . . . Question: Does S 
belong to S? If S belongs to S, then S is not a member of itself . . . 
On the other hand, if [S does not belong to S], then S belongs to S. 
In either case, we have a contradiction.
72
 
It is this paradox that defeats positivist jurisprudence. 
Positivist jurisprudence purports to be a closed set of sets. In fact it 
must contain at least one subset that does not belong to the larger set.
73
 
The proposition of positivist jurisprudence can be expressed as follows. 
Let w represent a domain of possible litigation outcomes. It includes 
outcomes that are legally required and outcomes that are merely 
subjectively desired. 
 
 
 72. JECH, supra note 4, at 4. 
 73. Analogously, for any class A there is a subclass B of A such that B is not an element of A. 
SMULLYAN & FITTING, supra note 30, at 17. 
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Let x represent a set of primary rules. Primary rules select from w those 
outcomes that are legally required: wx∈x. w-wx may be conceived as 
subjectively desired outcomes that are not legally required. x may be 
conceived as a function on w: Φ(w)=x. 
Let y represent the universal set of law, as determined by a rule of 
recognition: xy.74 y is therefore a set of sets (i.e., each primary rule is a 
set of legally required outcomes). Set y is to be conceived as the range of a 
function on x: y=Φ(x). 
Putting these points together, positivism defines law as the set of 
socially conventional secondary rules Φ(x) by which officials recognize 
the set of primary rules. 
Russell’s Paradox involves self-reference. So we must now imagine 
that the rule of recognition recognizes itself as a law, or Φ(x)=x. Suppose 
the rule of recognition is “whatever Parliament enacts is law.” Under this 
conjuration, the learned lords enact the following law: “Whatever 
Parliament passes is law.” In such a case, the secondary rule becomes a 
primary rule.
75
 So far, however, we have no contradiction. We have 
merely a set that belongs to itself. This is usually permissible in set theory. 
For example, the set of all sets with more than two elements belongs to 
itself.
76
 
Now suppose that Parliament passes this law: “Nothing Parliament 
says or ever will say is law.” This is Hart’s legislative suicide.77 Once this 
 
 
 74. xy is to be read as “x is a subset of y.”  (inclusion) differs from membership (∈) in that ∈ 
can refer either to subsets or to “individuals.” ALPHA CHIANG, FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF 
MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 13 (3d ed. 1984). “It is well known that logic and mathematics are 
expressible in a language comprising only alternative denial . . . , universal quantification, and the 
predicate ∈ of class membership.” QUINE, supra note 2, at 201; see also id. at 113 (“we may think of 
‘∈’ as the one sign for set theory in addition to those of elementary logic”). 
 75. Hart disputes this point. The rule of recognition, he writes, “is not a rule on the same level as 
the ‘laws strictly so called’ which it is used to identify. Even if the [rule of recognition] were enacted 
by statute, this would not reduce it to the level of a statute; for the legal status of such an enactment 
necessarily would depend on the fact that the rule existed antecedently to and independently of the 
enactment.” HART, supra note 17, at 111. 
 76. Self-membership is sometimes outlawed by the Axiom of Regularity. PATRICK SUPPES, 
AXIOMATIC SET THEORY 53 (1960); ALAIN BADIOU, BEING AND EVENT 356 (Oliver Feltham trans., 
2005) (“ontology does not recognize any event, because it forecloses self-belonging”). Set theory often 
does without this axiom, useful though it is in defining cardinal numbers without reliance on the 
Axiom of Choice. JECH, supra note 4, at 27, 165–66. In general, any “well founded” set (one with an 
initial element) outlaws self-membership. SMULLYAN & FITTING, supra note 30, at 99–102. 
 The power set P(x) is based on self-membership. Take a set x of two elements {a,b}. P(x) is the 
set of all subsets of {a,b}. The size (or cardinality) of P(x) is 2n, where n is the number of elements in 
x. CHIANG, supra note 74, at 13; SUPPES, supra note 76, at 46–47. In a two-element set, there should 
be four subsets. These are: {∅: ∅ is the null set}, {a}, {b}, {a,b}. Thus, {a,b}∈{a,b}. Otherwise, 2n 
does not describe the power set. Id. at 47 (theorem 87). 
 77. See supra text accompanying notes 19–23. 
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primary rule is admitted in the set, law becomes a contradiction. Law can 
endure only if this particular primary rule is prohibited. Yet the 
prohibition does not conform to the socially recognized rule of recognition 
(“whatever Parliament says is law”). 
Sets of sets that do not belong to themselves are contradictory. This is 
the claim of Russell’s Paradox, which revolutionized set theory in 1902. 
The claim of positivist jurisprudence can be reproduced in the following 
set theory terms: 
(y)(x)(x∈y  Φ(x)) (1)78 
In jurisprudential English, (1) states that there exists a legal universe (y) 
such that for every primary rule (x) that exists in the universe (x∈y), a 
social rule of recognition (Φ) establishes membership of x in y. The entire 
phrase (Frege’s ill-considered axiom of abstraction)79 states that there is a 
legal universe in which every primary rule is grounded in some pre-
existing rule of recognition. 
In (1), Φ(x) is the rule of recognition. It selects members in y. For 
example, suppose Φ(x) stands for the rule that “whatever Parliament 
enacts is law.” Every x is a norm, and it is a member of y, when Φ selects 
it. y is therefore a closed system. On (1), y can be viewed as nothing but 
the rule that whatever Parliament enacts is a law. Law so conceived is 
intensive—reducible to a selecting function (a rule of recognition). When 
Φ chooses y as the rule, x=y and y∈y. This is no contradiction, but it 
shows that y can be a member of y if Parliament enacts y.
80
 
It is also the case that Φ could select the negative of y. Suppose 
Parliament enacts “nothing Parliament enacts is law,” or Φ(x) = -(y∈y).81 
Substituting this into (1): 
(y)(x)(x∈y  -(y∈y)) (2) 
 
 
 78. The symbol  means “there exists at least one.” The symbol  means “for all.” Φ represents 
a function that creates a set by selecting from a larger set according to a rule. For example, Φ could 
stand for “whatever Parliament enacts is law.” Φ would then select from the larger set of all normative 
sentences those sentences that have been enacted by Parliament into law. 
 79. SUPPES, supra note 76, at 5 (“given any property there exists a set whose members are just 
those entities having that property”). It is also called the axiom of unrestricted comprehension. TILES, 
supra note 5, at 146. According to this false theorem: If P is a property, there exists a set Y = {x: 
P(x)}. JECH, supra note 4, at 4.  
 80. Given (1) (y)(x)(x∈y  Φ(x)), we can eliminate x by substituting y: (y)(y)(y∈y  
Φ(y)). No contradiction here, if we get rid of the Axiom of Regularity. 
 81. Such an enactment might also be worded as follows: “Whatever Parliament enacts is not the 
law.” 
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In English, this says, “There exists a closed set (y) of rules (x) and in set y 
there exists the rule -(y∈y).” In other words, x is a rule (because enacted 
by Parliament) and -(y∈y) has been enacted by Parliament and therefore is 
an instance of x. So x is and is not a primary rule. 
In (2), since y=x, we can substitute y for x across the board. 
(y)(y)[(y∈y)  -(y∈y)] (3) 
In English, (3) means that the proposition of a closed universe logically 
requires one to believe that everything Parliament passes is law and that 
nothing Parliament passes is law. 
(y∈y)  -(y∈y) (4) 
By (4), positivist jurisprudence is a contradiction. The difficulty is that y 
purports to be a set that is not a member of itself. It both is and is not a 
primary rule. 
The implication of this exercise is that positivist law fails as a 
completed universe. There is at least one real unconventional rule 
organizing the set of primary rules that is not itself a signifier of Φ. In 
Gödelian terms, there exists a sentence which is not provable in the formal 
system.
82
 That sentence would be “the enactment of -(y∈y) is prohibited.” 
Φ(x) must not be allowed to select -(y∈y).83 
 
 
 82. See JECH, supra note 4, at 157 (“The First Incompleteness Theorem shows that no consistent 
(recursive) extension of Peano Arithmetic is complete. In particular, if ZFC is consistent (as we 
believe), no additional axioms can prove or refute every sentence in the language of set theory.”). ZFC 
refers to the Zermelo-Fränkel axioms, with the controversial Axiom of Choice thrown in. Id. at 3. 
 83. The result reached here parallels that derived in Alfred Tarski, On Undecidable Statements in 
Enlarged Systems of Logic and the Concept of Truth, 4 J. SYMBOLIC LOGIC 105 (1939). Tarski’s 
theorem is that there is no set-theoretical property T(x) such that, if σ is a sentence, T(╔σ╗) holds iff σ 
holds. JECH, supra note 4, at 162. ╔σ╗ represents an encoding of σ within a sequence of all valid 
sentences in the language of set theory. The proof invokes a sequence of formulas at least one of which 
commits suicide. 
Let T(x) be defined as 
 x(T(x)  {x is an ordinal number}) & σ  T(╔σ╗) 
Imagine an enumeration of all formulas  with one free variable: 
 0(x), 1(x), 2(x) . . . 
ψ(x) represents a formula programmed to blow up. It stands for 
 {x: x is an ordinal number} & -T(╔x(x)╗). 
There is a natural number k such that ψ(x) = k(x). Then 
 σ  ψ(k)  -T(╔k(k)╗)  -T(╔σ╗). 
Yet T(x) was defined as σ  T(╔σ╗). Hence, σ means T(╔σ╗) and -T(╔σ╗) simultaneously. In this 
proof ψ(x) is the equivalent of “nothing Parliament says is law.” 
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B. The Axiom Scheme of Separation 
In set theory, Russell’s Paradox engendered the Zermelo-Fränkel 
axioms, designed to stave off contradiction by banishing any reference to 
the set of all sets. Once this is done, the set of all non-self-belonging sets 
cannot infect the brew. But the price of this banishment is that set theory 
has no criterial theory of what a set is.
84
 In effect, set theory prohibits the 
theorizing of sets, if “theorizing” means reducing objects to their rules of 
recognition. 
The legislative abolition of the set of all sets that are not members of 
themselves is accomplished by Fränkel’s axiom scheme85 of separation. 
The point of this axiom scheme is to prevent closure of the system. So 
long as the system is not closed, we can refer to -(y∈y) without generating 
the contradiction of (4).
86
 
Formally, the axiom scheme of separation is expressed as follows: 
(y)(x)(x∈y  (x∈z  Φ(x)) (5)87 
In jurisprudential English, (5) asserts that there exists a set of laws (y) and 
there exists a member of that set (x) such that x is a law (x∈y). x has been 
chosen from the set of all possible norms (z). Or, given a formula Φ(x), for 
every set y, there exists a set z such that the formula selects for y an 
element of z.
88
 x is selected from some other set z by Φ to be a member of 
y. But it is important to comprehend that Φ(x) no longer stands for 
Parliamentary enactment. Rather, it stands for the rule by which we 
recognize that a statement (whether enacted by Parliament or not) is 
normative (i.e., it is a sentence that uses, or could be rewritten to use, 
“ought”). Imagine that z stands for “all possible normative statements, 
whether enacted by Parliament or not.” Once the axiom scheme of 
separation is adopted, Russell’s Paradox no longer functions. Suppose, as 
before, Φ recognizes that in z is the principle that nothing Parliament 
enacts is law -(y∈y). Then (x∈z  -(y∈y)). This is not to say that 
Parliament has enacted -(y∈y). All Parliament has done is to enact (x∈y). 
 
 
 84. See MAXWELL ROSENLICHT, INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS 2 (1968) (“We do not attempt to 
define the word set”). 
 85. The word “scheme” is used because the axiom scheme is not a single axiom but is in fact a 
family of axioms (Φ), any one of which could be chosen according to the form of the scheme. 
MICHAEL POTTER, SET THEORY AND ITS PHILOSOPHY 13–14 (2004). 
 86. See QUINE, supra note 2, at 202 (stating that -(x∈x) “can be ruled out by one or another 
stipulation; but it is significant that such stipulations are ad hoc, unsupported by intuition”). 
 87. SUPPES, supra note 76, at 7. 
 88. JECH, supra note 4, at 177. 
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It is only the case that -(y∈y) has been recognized (Φ) as a possible norm 
that Parliament might enact. In short, we have “Parliament has acted” and 
“what Parliament enacts ought not to be a law.” These propositions are 
quite consistent with each other.
89
 
Now if x=y, and if we eliminate all x by substituting y, we obtain 
 y∈y  (y∈z  -(y∈y)) (6) 
In jurisprudential terms, this states that “whatever Parliament enacts is 
law” is in fact enacted by Parliament (y∈y). It further states that if y∈y, 
then, by implication, y is a norm (y∈z) and one of the norms in z happens 
to be “nothing Parliament enacts is law.” There is no contradiction here. 
Parliament might enact y. In addition, it could be true that Parliamentary 
suicide is a norm that Parliament has not necessarily enacted. 
The trick is that in (5), we are given a set z dogmatically (“there is a 
closed set of norms, whether enacted by Parliament or not”). Then we 
assert the subset y (“whatever norm Parliament enacts is law”) and make 
claims about its membership (y∈y).90 In comparison, (1) asserted y 
unconditionally and unconventionally. In (1), -(y∈y) could be made into a 
social rule by Φ. Therefore, y was both a social rule and not a social rule. 
It is my contention that Russell’s Paradox defeats legal positivism. 
Positivism simultaneously asserts (x∈y) & -(x∈y).91 Therefore, the 
existence of the legal system depends on the legislature not enacting 
-(x∈y). So an unlegislated primary rule exists: -(x∈y) is not permitted.92 
Yet Parliament has never enacted it. Therefore, the prohibition of -(x∈y) 
exceeds the stated rule of recognition (“only what Parliament enacts is 
law”). At least one primary rule with no pedigree in the positivist rule of 
recognition is required to sustain the system requiring that all primary 
rules have pedigrees. Inevitably, something real and universal—
 
 
 89. Consistency is a defined term in set theory. Once we assume that a theory (say, ZF) is 
consistent (something ZF cannot establish for itself), we ask whether it remains consistent if we add 
another axiom (Φ). Suppose we add Φ to ZF. ZF+Φ is consistent relative to ZF if the following holds: 
If ZF is consistent, then ZF+Φ is consistent. If, in addition, ZF+(-Φ) is consistent, then Φ is 
independent of ZF. JECH, supra note 4, at 163 (describing Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem). 
 90. The axiom scheme is therefore sometimes called the subset axiom. TILES, supra note 5, at 
122. 
 91. This formulation is correct, though I have heretofore referred to -(y∈y). Since Parliament has 
enacted -(y∈y), -(y∈y) = x, and x is both a member and not a member of y. 
 92. One prominent positivist, at least, agrees. Leslie Green, The Duty to Govern 13 LEGAL 
THEORY 165, 182 (2007) (“Even if Dicey was right in thinking that the U.K. Parliament could lawfully 
commit suicide by transferring all its powers to the Manchester Corporation, it can scarcely be denied 
that this would be regarded as an immoral alienation of its duty to govern”) (footnote omitted, citing 
A.V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1959)). 
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something not conventional—intrudes upon the supposedly conventional 
system.
93
 
C. Responses 
The above demonstration shows that positivism is not a tenable 
enterprise. As many positivists will wish to resist this conclusion, let me 
anticipate a few responses. 
One possible response is that my example shows merely that law 
depends on will. The legislature must refrain from enacting -(x∈y). So 
long as it refrains, the legal system exists. Ergo legal positivism is 
possible. This is a bit like saying that there is nothing wrong with Frege’s 
intensive set theory, so long as Frege does not use the axiom of abstraction 
to generate the set of all sets that do not self-belong.
94
 It is true that 
subjective inhibition can sustain Fregeian set theory: do not refer to the set 
of all sets that do not belong to themselves. In effect, that is what the 
Axiom of Separation establishes. Yet the price of adopting this strategy is 
that set theory is sustained by will, not grounded in logical principle. That 
is precisely what Zermelo and Fränkel concluded.
95
 The axiom scheme of 
separation is the moral prohibition of the set of all sets that do not belong 
to themselves. It is moral because reason itself (not mere will) requires the 
prohibition in order to sustain the possibility of a noncontradictory set 
theory.
96
 Similarly, in jurisprudence, Parliament cannot be permitted to 
 
 
 93. Jules Coleman writes that law would not be separate from morality: 
 [I]f it were not merely a contingent social fact about all legal systems that their rules of 
recognition made morality a condition of legality, if, for example, it could not be otherwise, 
that the concept of law required that law be a matter of morality. Then, the relationship 
between legality and morality would be intensional. Only then would there be no separation 
between law and morality of the sort envisioned by the separability thesis. 
Coleman, Social Facts, supra note 8, at 723. Coleman has it exactly backwards. The very 
intensionality of law gives rise to the paradox. Jurisprudence is inevitably extensional—not reducible 
to a rule of recognition. For this very reason and as a fundamental matter of logic, law cannot close 
itself to morality. 
 94. This is the strategy that Bentrand Russell followed in his now-forgotten theory of ramified 
types. TILES, supra note 5, at 170–71. 
 95. QUINE, supra note 41, at 14 (“As Fraenkel has put it, logicism holds that classes are 
discovered while intuitionism holds that they are invented . . . “). 
 96. An anonymous reviewer of a journal found cause to reject this essay because the remark in 
the text supposedly demonstrates that I have an idiosyncratic view of morality: how could mathematics 
be subject to moral principle? In fact, the great mathematician David Hilbert explicitly viewed the 
axioms of set theory to be moral principles. See PAUL J. COHEN, SET THEORY AND THE CONTINUUM 
HYPOTHESIS 2–3 (1966). Georg Simmel is among those who saw that logic is in the end a moral 
enterprise. GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 438 (Tom Bottomore & David Frisby eds., 
2d ed. 1978) (1907) (“one can elude a superior logic only by a stubborn ‘I don’t want to,’ which 
implies a confession of inferiority”). 
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commit suicide. Only this rule grounded in universal reason sustains the 
set of primary rules over time. 
A related retort would continue with the idea that arbitrary will, not 
morality, sustains the legal system. If law concededly depends on the will 
not to enact -(x∈y), perhaps such a will is not a moral will. If so, then law 
perhaps is logically independent of morality. This strategy will not work. 
Suppose the will of the legislature is corrupt. Its motive is pathological: it 
refrains from enacting -(x∈y) only because it selfishly wants to perpetuate 
parliamentary salaries. Therefore the legal system does not depend on 
morality. Rather, it depends on a will that might be immoral. Yet it 
remains true that law’s dependence on will is itself a universal, normative 
truth that describes what the legislature must not do if it is to perpetuate 
the legal regime. It is a supra-conventional “ought” that is the very 
condition for the possibility of law. Where the will to survive is corrupt, 
then will is governed by a mere hypothetical imperative. Any such 
legislative heteronomy is contingent. Being contingent, it cannot last. 
Given enough time, what may happen will happen. When the legislature 
grows tired of its corruption, law must cease.
97
 Only a universal exercise 
of will—i.e., morality–sustains a legal system over time.98 
A third possible response is that, even if positivism is contradictory, it 
is nevertheless what people mean by the word “law.”99 When it comes to 
word usage, there is no reason to outlaw contradiction. This is a good 
point, but it is not a philosophical point. It is a sociological one, and 
therefore is not admissible in the docket of legal philosophy.
100
 That 
people can survive in a state of cognitive dissonence does not make their 
bad philosophies into good ones. Empirically, people may continue to 
 
 
 The anonymous reviewer demonstrates that positivism has no definition of morality—just an 
unspoken intuition that it has something to do with, say, sexual conduct or honoring thy father and thy 
mother. This constitutes “confusing moral ideas with moral sentiments.” ANGELICA NUZZO, IDEAL 
EMBODIMENT: KANT’S THEORY OF SENSIBILITY 80 (2008). Only by such tactics can positivism defend 
itself. 
 97. As the Politburo learned twenty years ago. 
 98. Coleman is doubly wrong in implying that “positivism is not wedded to any particular meta-
ethical or moral ontology.” COLEMAN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 8, at 159. Indeed, it wishes to assert the 
conventionality of law, which is a meta-ethical position. “No meta-ethics” is a form of meta-ethics, 
like it or not. Furthermore, conventionality is a contradiction, so it relies on some meta-ethical position 
other than conventionalism of which it is unaware. Relevant here is the classic remark of Charles 
Peirce: “Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without metaphysics . . . and you have found 
one whose doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized metaphysics with which they 
are packed.” 1 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS § 129 (1960). 
 99. RAZ, AUTHORITY, supra note 32, at 49–50; Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of the 
Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909, 1945–46 (2004). 
 100. RAZ, AUTHORITY, supra note 32, at 44 (legal philosophy must address what is necessary for 
“all legal systems”). 
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practice Fregean set theory, but that doesn’t make it into a good set 
theory.
101
 
A fourth response is a perennial favorite of all philosophers—we knew 
it all the time! You’re not telling us anything we didn’t already know! Did 
not Hart himself introduce the idea of legislative suicide? Hart held that 
England’s rule of recognition has an anti-suicide provision in it, such that 
judges will not recognize -(y∈y), even if Parliament enacts it.102 The claim 
that “Hart knew it all the time” must be rejected. First, Hart (not a 
positivist as I have defined it)
103
 held that such an anti-suicide provision 
embedded within the rule of recognition was not logically required.
104
 He 
said was that England had a social rule of recognition. This social rule 
happens to conform to what reason, logic and morality require. But this 
doesn’t mean that conventionality is the source of the rule. 
Conventionally, people may agree that 2+2=4, but conventionality is not 
the reason why 2+2=4. In any case, Hart erred by insisting that the anti-
suicide provision is a matter of mere convention. In fact, it is reason, not 
convention, that prohibits -(y∈y). 
To summarize, positivism fails because practice cannot be reduced to 
socially determined rules. But the claim of positivism itself is not a 
socially determined rule. Positivism is a set that does not belong to itself. 
Does this prove that law and morality are therefore related? Does law 
logically required morality? The answer is yes. A symbolic system, 
whether it be set theory or law, always has a fissure in it—the traumatic 
intrusion of a real (i.e., non-conventional, unsymbolized) thing. This real 
thing is objective and universal. It is the law itself. And it is the moral law. 
We are, after all, talking about the set of primary rules, and whether it can 
be determined completely by a determinate rule of recognition. The 
application of Russell’s Paradox shows that at least one member of the set 
of primary rules must be a universal, unconventional norm—a sentence 
not provable within the system.  
 
 
 101. Set theory has not entirely abandoned the set of all sets. Such a concept is called a “proper 
class,” which is not deemed to be a “set.” JECH, supra note 4, at 6, 8, 58, 65, 67. Except for the “proper 
class,” all classes are sets. Id. at 6. 
 102. HART, supra note 17, at 148–49. 
 103. See supra Part II.B. 
 104. Id. at 145 (“It is, however, important to see that no necessity of logic, still less of nature, 
dictates that there should be such a Parliament”). 
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III. RAZ’S PARADOX 
Before concluding, I would like to discuss Joseph Raz’s reading of 
Dworkin, according to which positivism is saddled with a paradox. The 
issue is whether Raz has anticipated my use of Russell’s Paradox against 
the coherence of positivism, in which case I am saying nothing original in 
this Article. Positivism would then be able to claim, “Oh, we knew that all 
along.” 
My conclusion is that Raz has not done so. Rather, Raz improperly 
reduces Dworkin to an invalid quaternio terminorum. A quaternio 
terminorum is a logical error in the following form: (A) all stars are in 
heaven; (B) Megan Fox is a star; therefore (C) Megan Fox is in heaven.
105
 
The error stems from the fact that the word “star” in (A) surreptitiously 
changes meanings in the minor premise (B). 
In his essay, No Right Answer?,
106
 Dworkin imagines a positivism in 
which the law of the excluded middle holds. According to the law of the 
excluded middle, a thing either is or is not. Nothing can both exist and 
not-exist. In legal terms, either a person has a duty not to do x, or the 
person is permitted to do x. One or the other proposition must be true. 
This, I maintain, is not positivism. Rather, it is a legal system underwritten 
by an unpositivized moral principle: whatever is not prohibited is 
permitted. 
In what follows, x is a primary rule and Φ(x) is its rule of recognition. 
For the sake of exposition, assume that Φ(x) is “Parliament has enacted x.” 
In Raz’s rendition of Dworkin’s critique, positivism is reduced to the 
following rule of recognition: 
x  Φ(x) (7) 
This says that, if you observe x in the statute books, you can infer that 
Parliament enacted x. And, equivalently (), if you sit in the gallery and 
observe Parliament passing x (Φ(x)), you can be sure that x will appear in 
the statute books. To use Raz’s example, if x stands for “kill no 
butterflies,” it must be true that Parliament has enacted a law commanding 
“kill no butterflies.” 
 
 
 105. See IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 206–08 (11th ed. 2002). 
According to Kant, “Such a syllogism is a paralogism, in so far as one deludes oneself by it; a 
sophism, in so far as one deliberately tries to delude others by it.” IMMANUEL KANT, LOGIC 138 
(Robert S. Hatman & Wolfgang Schwarz trans., 1974). 
 106. Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR 
OF H.L.A. HART 58 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977). 
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The “counterposition”107 of (7) is 
-x  -Φ(x) (8) 
This says that if you fail to find x in the books, Parliament has not acted. 
The illegitimate move occurs in the next step, where we are to imagine 
that Parliament has affirmatively enacted the proposition that x (“kill no 
butterflies”) is not to appear in the statute book. 
-x  Φ(-x) (9) 
In this formulation, -x simultaneously means “there is no enactment 
concerning butterflies” and “it is permitted to kill butterflies.” -x therefore 
changes meanings in midstream. On the one hand, -x is a failure of 
Parliament to act. On the other, it is Parliament’s act. 
The final step is 
-Φ(x)  Φ(-x). (10)108 
This combines (8) and (9). It states that Parliament has acted and 
Parliament has not acted. In terms of butterflies, it states that Parliament 
has not acted with regard to butterflies -Φ(x) and therefore Parliament has 
acted to permit the massacre of butterflies. “This conclusion is patently 
false,” Raz writes, supposedly on behalf of Dworkin: 
 In England . . . there is no source for the legal proposition that it 
is legally prohibited to kill any butterfly, but neither is there a 
source for its contradiction, i.e. that it is not legally prohibited to kill 
any butterfly. [(7)] must be rejected.
109
 
According to Raz, x in (10) stands for “thou shalt not kill butterflies” and 
-x stands for “you are permitted to kill butterflies.” In fact, (10) is the 
result of switching the meaning of -x between (8) and (9). In (8), -x stands 
for “I can’t find any statute about butterflies” and in (9) -x stands for 
“there is a statute about butterflies.” In (8) there is no statute. In (9), there 
is a statute. In a regime where only parliamentary enactments are law, 
these are not equivalents. The conclusion in (10), which Parliament’s 
 
 
 107. RAZ, AUTHORITY, supra note 32, at 55. A “counterposition” or “contrapositive” consists in 
assuming that the negation of a conclusion produces the negation of the premise. Take the statement 
“if x>0, then x3╪0.” The contrapositive asserts, “If x3=0, then x≯0.” JAMES R. MUNKRES, TOPOLOGY 8 
(2d ed. 2000). 
 108. Actually, Dworkin’s position is: 
 -x  -Φ(x) or Φ(-x). 
From this it is impossible to derive (10), as Raz has purported to do. 
 109. RAZ, AUTHORITY, supra note 32, at 55. 
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failure to enact implies an enactment is the product of surreptitiously 
switching the meaning of -x. 
Although Raz does not say so directly, suppose (10) is a genuine 
contradiction and not an error in logic. It would be solved by the addition 
of a moral principle: whatever is not prohibited is permitted. In such a 
case, Parliament not acting on butterflies is the equivalent of Parliament 
legislating freedom to kill butterflies. But this addition of a moral principle 
is not permitted by the precepts of positivism, although Dworkin’s 
jurisprudence would certainly permit it. 
Raz needlessly confesses that positivism has been caught dead to rights 
by the above contradiction (though the contradiction is simply the product 
of Raz’s misunderstanding of Dworkin). He therefore proposes four 
restrictions to prevent contradiction (in the spirit of Zermelo-Fränkel). 
None of these is required, as there is no contradiction presented in 
Dworkin’s work (only a tendentious description of positivism). These 
restrictions are on their own problematic, but as they address a non-
existent contradiction, it does not profit us to review them here any 
further. 
CONCLUSION 
It is not clear what positivism is supposed to be, but if it asserts that 
primary rules of law are purely conventional, then positivism gives rise to 
Russell’s Paradox, developed to show that intensive set theory is 
contradictory. Intension stands for rules of recognition that completely 
describe the system with no gaps. As a result of set theory, mathematicians 
now agree that the practice of mathematics exceeds the ability to theorize 
it. This is the lesson that jurisprudence must learn. When it does so, it will 
give up on the quest of eliminating moral criteria from the rule of 
recognition. Instead, it will find that law is indescribable as an objective 
matter. We can only tell provisional truths about it. And that, if only 
provisionally, is the truth of jurisprudence. 
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